We evaluated the impacts of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) on rural households' holdings of livestock and forest assets/trees. We found no indication that participation in PSNP induces households to disinvest in livestock or trees. In fact, households that participated in the program increased the number of trees planted, but there was no increase in their livestock holdings. We found no evidence that the PSNP protects livestock in times of shock. Shocks appear to lead households to disinvest in livestock, but not in trees. Our results suggest that there is increased forestry activity as a result of PSNP, and that improved credit access encourages households to increase their livestock holdings.
Introduction
There is an international perception that food aid to food-insecure households in poor developing countries is associated with a dependency syndrome. One hears arguments that food aid may change the behavior of its recipients by making them dependent on it and thus less active in their economic and social activities (Little 2008) . Unfortunately, few rigorous empirical studies look at the effects of food aid or safety net programs on the behavior of households, particularly if they influence how much households invest and what they invest in.
We studied the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in Ethiopia to see how it has affected households' investment and disinvestment in productive assets. While there have been some attempts to evaluate the PSNP, to our knowledge the only systematic attempt at evaluating the PSNP was made by Gilligan et al. (2008) . However, they only had access to recall data on the variables studied, making any firm conclusions problematic. In our paper, however, we used panel data from household surveys in 2002, 2005, and 2007 in the Amhara region of Ethiopia; these data were collected both before the PSNP started and about two years after it started. This paper also contributes to the existing literature by exploring some of the underlying mechanisms of the relationship between safety net programs and investment in assets.
The PSNP is currently the largest operating social protection program in sub-Saharan Africa outside of South Africa. It differs from previous food-for-work programs, in that it focuses continuously on selected households over several years and in that the explicit objective is that it will eventually be phased out. For this reason, its impacts and effectiveness are important, both in their own right and because they have implications for food-for-work programs elsewhere.
The PSNP is a public program through which food-insecure people are employed in public work for five days a month during the agricultural slack season. This is intended to enable households to smooth consumption so that they will not need to sell productive assets in order to overcome food shortages. The public work is also intended to create valuable public goods; moreover, by reducing seasonal liquidity constraints, it is intended to stimulate investments as well.
However, there is a risk that the program discourages private investments, which are central to future production opportunities. If more labor is allocated to public programs, then less labor is available for on-farm production and investments. There is also concern that if assets are themselves used as buffers or as a way to spread risk, introducing a public safety net may reduce the demand for asset holdings and lead to reduced on-farm investment.
Hence, in addition to studying the effect of the PSNP on asset holdings, we investigated whether assets themselves are used as informal safety nets. We studied both ex ante behavior, by examining whether risk aversion determines investments in assets, and ex post behavior, by examining whether assets are sold in times of temporary shocks. We also explored whether the potential role of productive assets as a safety net was affected by the introduction of a public safety net. This paper focuses specifically on livestock and tree holdings. These assets are especially interesting for several reasons. Livestock is usually considered to be the most important productive asset in rural Ethiopia in general, and in our study areas in particular. If households can increase the number of their livestock, they have a good chance of becoming more food secure. Tree holdings, especially holdings of fast-growing eucalyptus, play a similar role as livestock and are also worth examining from an environmental perspective. Ethiopia's forest cover is estimated to be below 4 percent of the country's total area (about 1 million km 2 ) and deforestation is estimated at 200,000 hectares per year (Mekonnen and Bluffstone 2008) .
Livestock and trees can potentially be informal safety nets. Livestock holdings may be used to buffer temporary income shocks. 1 Drought-resistant trees may also be planted to sell and thus offset income shocks and reduce the vulnerability of income to weather conditions. 2 This paper is structured as follows. The background section discusses previous experiences with food-for-work programs, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, and describes the PSNP.
Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion of some of the possible problems involved. Section 3 presents the data and econometric specifications, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes the paper.
1 For a discussion of the potential role of livestock as a buffer, see, e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) .
2 For the role of forest products as natural insurance, see, e.g., McSweeney (2004).
Background
In Ethiopia, food insecurity has long been a widespread problem. 3 Over 80 percent of Ethiopia's 80 million people live in rural areas and are heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture; this makes them extremely vulnerable to changes in weather conditions. Over the last four decades, there has been a number of severe famines due to droughts in Ethiopia. Even in years with normal rainfall, food shortages and hunger are recurrent problems for millions of people.
More recently, this problem has been exacerbated by increases in food prices.
The problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia has, to a large extent, been addressed by annual emergency food aid from abroad. During the past two decades, Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of food aid in Africa and one of the largest recipients in the world (Little 2008) .
For the individual beneficiary, food aid has been characterized by uncertainty, poor timing, and insufficient assistance. In 2005, to combat the persistent problem of food insecurity and to move away from the previous system of annual emergency appeals, the Ethiopian government and a consortium of donors launched a new social protection program called the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). With an annual budget of nearly US$ 500 million, the PSNP is a huge program, reaching more than 7 million Ethiopians (Gilligan et al. 2008 ).
The PSNP has two components: public works and direct support. Public works are used to mitigate the impacts of climatic and food insecurity risks on chronically food-insecure farmers by providing employment to "able-bodied" laborers. It is the core component of the safety net program and creates a labor market for unskilled labor, primarily by involving them in laborintensive, community-based activities. Direct support is a minor component and delivers assistance to members of the community who cannot participate in public works but need help.
Rural labor markets in Ethiopia are thin or imperfect and jobs are not readily available when needed. The wage rate for public works can therefore be set at slightly below the market wage in order to attract only the chronically food-insecure, able-bodied household members.
Wages are paid in cash or in kind, depending on specific circumstances. Most of the public works are undertaken during the dry season, which is also a slack season, because farmers are expected to return to their usual labor-intensive private agricultural activities during the main rainy season.
Many safety net beneficiaries can also benefit from other food security program interventions. The anticipation is that, since households will no longer need to sell off assets as a result of income shocks, their productive assets will increase over time. With the help of the safety net and other programs, these food-insecure households are expected to graduate from their chronic situation in five years. Safety net activities are integrated with wereda 4 development plans to ensure that quality assets are built within the (necessary) budget allocated. These activities include public works, on-farm improvements, educational incentives, and environmental protection measures such as tree planting on public land and soil/water conservation measures. Safety net resources should be flexible enough to offer a wide range of activities that fit the food security plan of the wereda and also ensure timely and efficient use of these resources.
The selection of beneficiaries for both the public works and direct support components of the safety net program uses a mix of administrative criteria and community input. For the public works, beneficiary households are identified through a series of criteria. The basic criteria for inclusion in the program, as stated in the manual, are summarized in table 1. The manual contains additional factors that should be assessed (see table 2). Table 1 Basic Targeting Criteria for Inclusion in PSNP
• Households should be members of the community.
• Chronically food-insecure households which have faced continuous food shortages (usually a 3-month food gap or more) in the last three years and which have received food assistance prior to the commencement of the PSNP program are eligible.
• Households which suddenly become more food insecure as a result of a severe loss of assets and which are unable to support themselves (in the past 1-2 years) are also eligible.
• Any household without family support and other means of social protection and support is eligible. Beneficiaries who are eligible for direct support receive it without any conditions.
Communities select these beneficiaries in collaboration with the lowest government administrative units, the kebeles. It is expected that combining the community and the local administration makes targeting more cost-effective and minimizes errors. Three issues that determine eligibility for public works and direct support are a household's chronic history of food need, level of the food gap or unmet need, and household labor available for work.
Previous studies from Ethiopia have indicated that, although food-for-work programs have been crucial for saving poor rural households in times of food shortages, they may have negative impacts on agricultural intensification (Barrett et al. 2004 ), short-term soil conservation measures (Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003) , informal risk sharing (Dercon and Krishnan 2004) , and growth of livestock holdings (Gilligan and Hoddinott 2007) . The latter study concluded that the slower growth rate in livestock holdings among participants may be due to reduced demand for precautionary savings. This assumes that livestock are used as an income buffer and are sold to cope with temporary shortfalls in income. However, empirical studies of the role of livestock as an income buffer have been mixed (see Fafchamps et al. 1998; McPeak 2004; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Udry 1995) . Gilligan et al. (2008) found that the PSNP and other food security programs increased food security, but at the same time reduced growth rates in livestock holdings. However, they considered only the average net effect from the beginning of the period considered in their survey to the end. While this is valuable information, it does not say anything about how successful the safety net is in protecting assets in times of temporary income shocks, even though this is one of the main goals of the program.
Early assessments indicate that PSNP does reach the intended households. In a household survey reported in Sharp et al. (2006) , beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were asked why they thought they were included or excluded from the PSNP. The beneficiaries most frequently reported that relative poverty was the main reason they had been included in the program.
Similar results were found among non-beneficiaries, who most frequently reported that they were less poor than the beneficiaries as the main reason for their exclusion. Other variables repeatedly mentioned as important were food access, farming assets (landholdings and livestock), and off-farm income.
Theory
There has long been concern that food-for-work programs may reduce investment in productive assets. One obvious reason is that the labor used in the food-for-work program will tend to crowd out labor use in other activities, such as on-farm investment. Another possible reason is that food for work may reduce the need for precautionary savings. Deaton (1990 Deaton ( , 1991 , Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) , and other authors have developed a theoretical framework for the role of asset holdings under income uncertainty. They showed that, in the absence of functioning credit markets, households that are sufficiently risk averse will save for the future in order to smooth consumption, even if they have high discount rates. The exact composition of the asset portfolio will depend on the relative yield and riskiness of different assets and the risk aversion of the individual household. For a household with high discount rates, however, reduced uncertainty in future income (through, for example, the existence of a predictable food-for-work program) will lead to increased consumption now at the expense of investment in assets.
In developing countries, savings by agricultural households frequently takes the form of productive assets that are also used on the farm, such as livestock. This means that for the individual farmer (who usually has a high discount rate, but is also liquidity constrained)
livestock has a dual role-as a buffer for consumption smoothing and as an income generator.
From the policy maker's perspective, however, the fact that livestock is a productive asset makes livestock holdings an important target of government policy to improve agricultural output. The fact that these holdings are depleted in times of negative income shocks is cause for serious concern.
Similarly, Delacote (2007) showed that when tree production is seen as having relatively low profitability and low risk compared to agricultural production, risk-averse households will plant trees to smooth consumption. However, if risk in agriculture is reduced, forest cover will be reduced because the need for consumption smoothing provided by the trees is less. This means that-to the extent that forest cover also creates positive externalities from reduced soil erosion or improved water flows, for example-reduced risk for the individual farmer will lead to a reduction in the positive externality generated by the forest cover.
Generally speaking, this implies that policies that aim to improve income security for agricultural households may have unintended side effects on their investment behavior. On one hand, policy makers are interested in livestock and forest investment because they have positive impacts on long-term productivity. On the other hand, households without access to credit or insurance markets, and with high discount rates, invest in these assets partly as precautionary measures rather than for the sake of increased productivity. Consequently, they may very well disinvest in these assets if income security improves. Whether this happens in practice and, if so, what assets are affected the most depends on the perceived riskiness and yield of the assets. It also depends on the risk aversion of the households involved and their discount rates.
Data and Econometric Specification

Data
We used panel data collected in 2002, 2005, and 2007 through collaborative research projects of Addis Ababa University, the University of Gothenburg, and the World Bank. The data come from 14 sites in the East Gojam and South Wollo zones of the Amhara region of Ethiopia. However, we only used the data from South Wollo because the sites in East Gojam were not covered by the PSNP and many of the agricultural characteristics of the two zones are different, making East Gojam unsuitable as a comparison region. The sites were selected to ensure variation in vegetation cover and agro-ecology, while the households from each site were selected at random.
The panel data were supplemented with data from a separate PSNP household survey conducted by the University of Gothenburg, Umeå University, and the Ethiopian Development
Research Institute from April to June 2008. 5 In the PSNP survey the households from the 5 To obtain information about food security and related programs from different sources, interviews were also conducted with officers responsible for food security issues from the wereda and kebele councils. In addition, some households took part in separate focus-group discussions during the survey period.
previous sample were asked about whether they had participated in the PSNP or other food-forwork programs during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007; they were also asked a few questions about their perceptions of the program.
The dataset contains information on the number of trees and livestock holdings per household, shocks, and household characteristics, as well as data on households' subjective discount rates and measures of risk aversion. Measures of risk aversion were calculated in a riskpreference experiment, while subjective discount rates were based on both open-ended questions to households about their subjective discount rate and a time-preference experiment. 6 The variables used in this study are described in table 3. Gave loan dummy Household gave loan to another household; proxy for income/economic status (1 = yes; 0 otherwise).
Credit access dummy
Household has access to credit when needed (1 = yes; 0 otherwise). Household experienced any shock due to crop loss: pest, disease, and theft (1 = yes; 0 otherwise).
Illness or death
Household experienced any shock due to death or illness of a person (1 = yes; 0 otherwise).
Livestock loss
Household experienced any shock due to loss of livestock (1 = yes; 0 otherwise).
Any shock
Household experienced any of the above-mentioned shocks; this is the shock variable actually used in the analysis (1 = yes; 0 otherwise). A few comments about the available data are in order. The dataset does not include price information. However, Ethiopia recorded high inflation throughout the survey period, especially the latter part. Nominal prices therefore increased for all of the outputs and inputs included in the survey. Wood prices appear to have gone up in recent years relative to prices of other crops, which may have made tree planting more attractive. The problem, however, is that many households cannot afford to tie up land for several years until the trees grow to mature size.
Independent variables for kebele dummies
Econometric Method
To study how participation in PSNP affects livestock and tree holdings, we needed to address the potential problem of selection bias. Selection bias stems from the fact that we cannot know what the outcome for a "treated" (i.e., participating) household will be if it does not receive the treatment. If treatment is randomly assigned, the outcome of untreated individuals serves as a good estimate of the counterfactual. However, if households that are treated have characteristics that differ from the ones that are not treated, comparison of the outcome between the two groups will yield biased estimates.
Formally, the above reasoning can be summarized as follows. Our main parameter of interest was the average treatment effect on the treated, which is given by:
where Y 1 is the treated outcome, Y 0 is the untreated outcome, D indicates treatment status and is equal to 1 if the individual receives treatment and 0 otherwise. The evaluation problem arises from the fact that the untreated outcome for a treated individual, )
, can never be observed. Using the outcome for untreated individuals as an estimate of the counter fact will generate bias equal to:
If the selection is based on variables that are observable to the analyst, the problem of selection bias can be solved by controlling for these variables in a regression analysis or the propensity score matching method. In the PSNP program, treatment is largely based on asset and income variables that are observable both to the policy makers and to the analyst; it was therefore straightforward to apply regression analysis in this paper, as this allowed us to easily address our primary study questions. 7 As we assumed that selection is based on variables that are observable to the analyst, it is important to control for variables that govern eligibility to the program. In the PSNP implementation manual and previous studies, the following variables are suggested: status of assets, income from non-agricultural activities and alternative employment, and support from relatives or community. It is also important to control for other variables that affect changes in asset holdings.
Regression Analysis
In the regression equation, changes in livestock and tree holdings were estimated as functions of variable levels at the beginning of the program and as changes in explanatory variables since the beginning of the program.
The general regression model to be estimated can be described as:
where y is tree/livestock holdings and X is the set of explanatory variables. The variables of special interest in this study are PSNP, risk aversion, income shocks, and the interaction effects of PSNP and risk aversion and income shocks. In the analysis, 2007 is used as period t and 2005 is used as period t-1.
The above specification gives rise to two potential problems. First, there is a risk of simultaneity between changes in asset holdings and both program participation and income variables. Second, there is a risk that y t-1 is correlated with the error term.
To avoid the potential risk of simultaneity between asset holdings and PSNP participation, we only used participation in period t-1 as an explanatory variable in the regression equation. Because most of the households participated in all of the years, the effect of this variable should be interpreted as the general effect of program participation and not only the effect of participation in period t-1. We employed the same strategy for the indicators of income and economic status. To avoid the problem of correlation between the level of the lagged dependent variable and the error term, asset holdings in period t-1 was instrumented with the level in period t-2 and other explanatory variables in period t-2. We tested endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) statistic. The test is based on the fact that if the variable is exogenous, OLS (ordinary least squares) should yield consistent estimates, and the only difference between OLS and 2SLS (two stage least squares) estimates should be different standard errors. If the results differ, it means that the presence of endogenous variables makes OLS estimates inconsistent.
In both the livestock and the tree regression, the null hypothesis that the lagged dependent variables are exogenous was rejected. To test if the instruments were correctly excluded from the estimated equation, we used the Sargan (1958) test for over-identification.
Under the null hypothesis, the excluded instruments were uncorrelated with the error term. In the livestock regression, correct exclusion of instruments could not be rejected. However, in the tree equation, the test indicated that this approach would be problematic because several of the explanatory variables from period t-2 appeared to be correlated with the error term. We therefore used a simpler approach, where only the number of trees in period t-2 was used as an instrument for period t-1. Table 6 presents results from the livestock models and table 7 presents the results from the tree models. Sargan tests indicated that for all three livestock models the excluded instruments were uncorrelated with the error term, and the DWH tests rejected the hypothesis of exogeneity for all three livestock models. Neither of these tests could be carried out for the tree models, where there was only one instrumental variable. Because the number of trees was a count data variable, the error term will be heteroskedastic-we therefore estimated robust versions of the tree models. For the changes in livestock holdings, there was no statistically significant impact of PSNP participation, as such, in any of the three estimated models. Income shocks had a negative impact on livestock holdings, supporting the buffer hypothesis; the interaction variable between PSNP participation and income shocks was positive and was almost identical to the income shock variable in magnitude (but was not statistically significant). Access to credit, which is one of the measures included in OFSP, had a positive impact on livestock holdings; so did the education level of the household head, as well as the level of farm income. Households that gave loans or received remittances also had larger increases in livestock holdings. On the other hand, we noted that, contrary to expectations, the household's discount rate did not appear to matter for the change in livestock holdings, and neither did risk aversion.
Results
For changes in the number of trees on the household's land (table 7) , many of the estimated coefficients had the same signs as those for the change in livestock holdings. However, tree holdings actually increased more for PSNP participants than for non-participants, and this difference was statistically significant. Income shocks had no significant effect on the change in the number of trees on the farm. The discount rate did not matter for tree holdings either. Risk aversion did have an impact, but we noted that the sign suggested that trees were not seen as a safer alternative than crops; tree holdings increased less for the risk-averse households. PSNP participation did not appear to affect the impact of risk aversion. Similar to the results for livestock holdings, remittances and being a lender had positive impacts on the change in tree holdings.
Conclusions
In this paper, we used regression analysis to evaluate the impacts of the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program on rural households' holdings of livestock and forest assets/trees.
We used panel data collected in three surveys from 2002 to 2007. There are remaining potential problems, such as possible selection issues. Still, compared to many similar studies, this study is an improvement for several reasons, including the fact that we had data on actual behavior both before and after the program started.
We found no indication that participation in PSNP leads households to disinvest in livestock or trees; in fact, the number of trees increased for households that participated in the program. It could be the case that participation in PSNP (where tree planting and subsequent forest management work on public lands are usual activities) leads to households becoming more skilled in forestry, and that they switch to increased forest planting as a result. In the presence of some possible competition for labor between PSNP and private activities, tree planting may also have been chosen because it tends to be less labor intensive.
An alternative, perhaps more plausible, interpretation is that while recent increases in wood prices may have made tree planting more profitable than crops, farmers may nonetheless be hesitant to plant trees because they take several years to grow and the land is unavailable for crop farming in the meantime. If this is the case, having a secure source of income from the PSNP while trees mature may well encourage farmers to switch from annual crops to trees. This would also explain the observed negative relationship between risk aversion and the number of trees; any long-term planting decisions would also be affected by uncertainty about future land tenure, making risk-averse farmers more hesitant to make planting decisions when the benefits are several years in coming.
We found no evidence that the PSNP protects livestock in times of shock. Shocks appear to lead households to disinvest in livestock, but not in trees. Conceivable explanations are that livestock is a more liquid asset and that livestock may die due to shocks, such as bad weather conditions. Another explanation can be that while households may harvest trees in times of shock, they may replant in sufficient numbers so that the total number of trees does not change much; replanting trees appears to be easier than reinvesting in livestock. Given the uncertain weather conditions, the fact that most of the households in our study areas mostly grow eucalyptus trees (which are fast growing and drought resistant) may also have contributed to this result.
PSNP has only been in place since 2005, and it may be too early to say what the longerterm impacts are. However, the official goal is to phase it out in a few years' time. Looking at our findings, it appears that there is no trend toward increased livestock holdings as a result of the program, despite the fact that this is one of its goals. On the other hand, the program does appear to encourage additional tree planting, which may have become more profitable in recent years. Thus, the program does seem to have raised the long-term income earning potential of the households in the survey, although perhaps not in the intended manner. Whether households will in fact be able to graduate from the program at its scheduled end date in 2010 remains to be seen, but it does appear that their incomes may be higher than before.
Our results suggest that increased forestry activity is taking place as a result of PSNP, and that improved credit access (which is part of OFSP, but not PSNP) leads to increases in livestock holdings. The first of these impacts is somewhat unexpected; the second impact is expected, but it is surprising that this factor appears to be more important than the existence of the PSNP. To the extent that PSNP and OFSP have lasting effects on household welfare, their effects appear to be more complex and indirect than expected.
